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COMMENT ON "THE NYLON CURTAIN: AMERICA'S
NATIONAL BORDER AND THE FREE FLOW OF IDEAS"
TOM A. COLLINS*
Professor Neuborne treats the first amendment as a monolithic
concept, including the right to speak or publish, the right to re-
ceive information, and the right to gather information. I must dif-
fer. The first of these, the right to speak and publish, is central to
the first amendment.' The rights to receive information and to
gather information are derivative of, or secondary to, the speech or
publication right.2  These distinctions are of substantial
importance.
Furthermore, in national security and foreign policy a strong, in-
deed substantial, discretion exists in the Executive. Congress ap-
propriately can define that discretion, or can give the Executive
great latitude. Frequently, Congress should permit great latitude
in the Executive's discretionary foreign affairs power, partly be-
cause of the Executive's competence and expertise, but also be-
cause of political factors. The executive policy is endorsed by the
elective process, and the Executive should be allowed to carry out
that policy.
I am not convinced, however, that the vesting of broad discretion
in the Executive precludes judicial review. United States courts are
bound to apply the general law, including the Constitution and
statutes, to the Executive. Courts also must consider counter-
vailing rights.
The first amendment-national security-foreign policy problem
exemplifies this conflict of discretion and constitutional rights,
while the application to Cuba of the travel restrictions permitted
by the Trading With the Enemy Act3 particularizes the problem.
*Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. A.B. 1963, Indiana University; J.D. 1969;
L.L.M. 1970, University of Michigan.
1. See Dworkin, Is the Press Losing the First Amendment, N.Y. REV. By-, Dec. 4, 1980, at
53-54.
2. Id.
3. Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. 5(b)(1982)).
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The change of administration since 1977, when travel restrictions
were removed by congressional act,4 and the imposition of the pre-
sent restrictions in 1982, account for a shift in policy.
The new travel restrictions should not surprise us. The new pol-
icy reflects changing political and policy choices. In addition, the
travel restrictions are simply. too plausible to be subject to chal-
lenge. Hard currency earnings of $8,000,000 are significant, and can
buy a lot of terror-consider that $14,000,000 supposedly can fund
the countries in and about Nicaragua for five months. The ban on
travel also fits perfectly with the Reagan administration's policy
toward Cuba: a policy of isolation and rejection at all levels and in
all things.
The right to gather information from Cuba, infringed by the re-
cent TWEA applications, is a derivative speech right. That right is
protected adequately in practice. Journalists and scholars are pro-
tected. They gather and transmit information more effectively
than others and the first amendment protects them more exten-
sively than others. And while it might be nice to be able to gather
all data, the press and others gather sufficient data for our pur-
poses. Indeed, as Alexander Meiklejohn-whom I invoke with
some hesitance-asserted in another context, the goal of the first
amendment is not that everyone has a chance to speak, but that all
that is worth saying be said.5 Perhaps we face an information over-
load and not a shortage. On balance, the asserted first amendment
right must give way to the Executive's national security
prerogative.
The receipt of printed material from Cuba presents a more diffi-
cult question. The receipt of material is a broader right than the
gathering of material. The Supreme Court has articulated the right
more clearly, but in peculiar circumstances. The receipt rationale
provided the basis for overturning the exclusion of advertising
from first amendment protection. Likewise, the rationale provided
an important justification in upholding the fairness doctrine in
broadcasting.7
4. The McGovern Amendment is codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2691 (1982).
5. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITIcAL FREEDOM 26 (1965).
6. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1975).
7. Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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The case for the ban on Cuban printed material is hard to jus-
tify. Consider the McCarran Act," which restricts the entry of
aliens into the United States. When General Pasti and Ms. Allende
were barred, the government restricted the flow of information into
the American political debate. The government did not base its ac-
tions on a specific foreign policy objective toward another state.
Instead, the government furthered a vague policy based on some-
what nebulous ideological factors. Even though the Supreme Court
has approved these measures, they nevertheless demand substan-
tial judicial scrutiny.
Unlike the exclusion of particular aliens, the ban on Cuban
printed materials is a very different matter. The ban constitutes
part of a total economic embargo that is integrated with a coherent
foreign policy. Further, the ban is part of a policy of total isolation
of Cuba for psychological effects, and as such has substantial sym-
bolic importance. Finally, the ban permits enough material to filter
back to the United States. Free material, library materials, materi-
als received from third countries, and information brought back by
journalists and scholars creates a very large information base.
I conclude with some doubt, therefore, that the ban on purchase
of printed material from Cuba should be upheld. The ban's valid-
ity results from a total, draconian policy which is politically moti-
vated, created, and endorsed. The accomodation of the need for
information and the need for a strong foreign policy has been made
in favor of foreign policy. The political process has worked rather
well.
Professor Neuborne addresses several further issues about which
I am in substantial agreement. He briefly deals with the control of
technological speech by preresearch contract or export controls.
The target of these controls is core first amendment material. This
technological data is pure speech and embodies the search for
truth fundamentally. It is vitally important.
In the area of technological "speech," there will be situations
where harm will occur if the speech is unrestricted. Specific stat-
utes should deal with these areas, which would include nuclear
weapons technology." Other areas of technology, such as lasers and
8. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982).
9. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
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computer technology, would result in more diffuse harm if un-
restricted. That may be difficult to control. Existing first amend-
ment doctrines, however, supply ample protection, although fur-
ther legal thought is mandated and welcomed.
Finally, let me speak of the certifications of film for export under
the Beirut Convention.'" This certification implicates rather nebu-
lous and peripheral foreign policy interests. The first amendment
values affected by these regulations are central to free speech.
Films enunciate ideas. Like articles and books, films contain politi-
cal ideas and deserve and receive full broad first amendment pro-
tection." Additionally, the issue of whether the Constitution fol-
lows the United States citizen abroad should be resolved in favor
of giving the most comprehensive first amendment protection. The
constitutional requirement of a jury trial in military dependent
cases arising overseas, which implicates foreign policy and national
security interests in a different way, argues for this result.' 2 Ac-
cordingly, content-based regulations here must fall.
The threatened first amendment interests and the foreign policy
interests discussed by Professor Neuborne must be considered in
context. When they are, an appropriate resolution of the national
interests inherently contained in them will occur.
10. Agreement for Facilitation the International Circulation of Visual and Auditory
Materials of an Educational, Scientific and Cultural Character, opened for signature, July
15, 1949, 17 U.S.T. 1578, T.I.A.S. No. 6116, 197 U.N.T.S. 3 (1949). Entered into force with
respect to the United States on January 12, 1967. See S. Rep. No. 626, 89th Cong. Ad.
News, 3143; Pub. L. 89-634, 80 Stat. 879 (1967)(formal ratification).
11. See Joseph Burstan, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
12. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); see also Henkin, The Constitution as Compact
and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and At Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 11
(1985).
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